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Abstract
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the Internet’s in-
terdomain routing protocol, is vulnerable to a number
of damaging attacks. Proposed solutions either (i) rely
on a public-key infrastructure and accurate routing reg-
istries or (ii) detect attacks only after they have spread
throughout the network. However, BGP routers could
avoid selecting and propagating malicious routes if they
were cautious about adopting new reachability informa-
tion. We describe an enhancement to BGP, Pretty Good
BGP (PGBGP), that slows the dissemination of mali-
cious routes, providing network operators time to re-
spond before the problem escalates into a large-scale In-
ternet attack. Results show that realistic deployments
of PGBGP could provide 99% of Autonomous Systems
with 24 hours to investigate and repair malicious routes
without affecting preﬁx reachability. The results also
show that without PGBGP, 40% of ASs cannot avoid us-
ing malicious routes; with PGBGP, this number drops to
less than 1%. Finally, we show that PGBGP is incremen-
tally deployable and offers signiﬁcant security beneﬁts to
early adopters and their customers.
1 Introduction
The Border Gateway Protocol [1] has been the Inter-
net’s de-facto interdomain routing protocol for the last
decade. It is a trusting and therefore vulnerable protocol
that does not ensure the validity of the route announce-
ments passed between BGP-speaking routers. Malicious
networks(AutonomousSystems)canexploitBGPbyan-
nouncing false routes in order to reroute trafﬁc to an in-
correct destination. For instance, on May 7th 2005, an
AS falsely claimed to originate Google’s preﬁx, which
contained IP addresses for www.google.com [2]. For
roughly one hour parts of the Internet could not reach
Google’s search engine as trafﬁc was misdirected to the
attacking AS. This is just one example of the kind of dis-
ruption that such attacks can cause. Rather than discard-
ing packets, the adversary could snoop the contents of
the packets or direct them to a different Web server to
return alternative content or steal sensitive user informa-
tion, such as ﬁnancial data or passwords.
Some solutions have been proposed to increase BGP’s
security, for example, refs. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. These rely on
global routing information maintained by a central au-
thority. The authority would authenticate the AS that
originates the BGP route for a destination preﬁx. It
would also ensure that the AS-path attribute in the adver-
tised route is a feasible path on the AS-level topology.
However, ASs have been reluctant to reveal their busi-
ness relationships, and existing registries, such as ARIN,
RIPE, and APNIC [8, 9, 10], are incomplete and often
inaccurate [11].
A second category of proposals relies on anomaly de-
tection [12, 13, 14] to identify attacks early in their prop-
agation and limit damage. This promising approach does
not require changing the BGP protocol and can be de-
ployed incrementally. However, to to be effective, an
anomaly detector must be coupled with an effective re-
sponse. Except for Whisper [13], which requires ubiq-
uitous deployment to detect inconsistent routes, the BGP
anomaly detectors do not actively stop the progression
of attacks, simply alerting a human operator who may
not be able to respond quickly enough (e.g., to prevent
identity theft).
In this setting, false negatives are more problematic
than false positives, because there are often multiple
routes available to any destination. An AS that selects
a malicious route places its customers in jeopardy, even
if for a short period of time (a false negative). However,
ifasuspiciousrouteiserroneouslydiscardedinfavorofa
trusted route (a false positive), little damage results in the
short run. Thus, we advocate avoiding suspicious routes
when credible alternatives exist until a secondary process
can conﬁrm their authenticity. This approach would pre-
vent a malicious route from harming any of the AS’s cus-
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some period of time, the suspected route could be re-
leased back into the network, causing no long-term loss
of reachability. This represents a fairly conservative ap-
proach to anomaly detection, which seems appropriate
given the vulnerabilities of BGP and the rather weak de-
fense mechanisms available in practice.
In this paper we present Pretty Good BGP, a system
that responds to BGP attacks by delaying their propaga-
tion. We illustrate PGBGP’s effectiveness by studying
its behavior on two of the most dangerous BGP exploits:
preﬁx hijacks and sub-preﬁx hijacks. PGBGP is the ﬁrst
BGP security proposal to address the sub-preﬁx hijack
problem. Because no protocol changes would be neces-
sary to implement PGBGP,it is incrementally deployable
via software updates and provides protective beneﬁts for
each AS that adopts it, even without widespread deploy-
ment in the rest of the Internet.
Our simulations show that on average over 97% of
ASs can be temporarily protected from preﬁx hijack at-
tempts, even if PGBGP is deployed on only the 62 most
highly connected ASs (only 0.3% of all ASs). For the
same deployment, on average over 85% of ASs can be
protected from sub-preﬁx hijack attempts. If deployed
on an additional set of randomly selected ASs across the
network, PGBGP can prevent over 99% of the network
from using hijack routes. An illegitimate route could
be ﬁxed within the time that it is suppressed, and the
vast majority of the network would be unharmed. We
show that without PGBGP, an average of nearly 50% of
the network immediately reroutes to a malicious AS, and
only 60% of the ASs are able to route around the attack
once it has been detected. Finally, the potential impact
of false positives is shown to be minimal, as only 0.1%
of BGP announcements are anomalous.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the challenges of detecting malicious
BGP routes, and Section 3 describes how PGBGP ad-
dresses these challenge. In Section 4, we describe a
simulator for evaluating PGBGP. Section 5 reports sim-
ulation results that assess PGBGP’s effectiveness under
various deployment scenarios. Section 6 discusses the
implementation overhead of PGBGP and options for in-
cremental deployment. Section 7 reviews related work,
and Section 8 presents our conclusions and directions for
future research.
2 Challenges of Detecting BGP Attacks
In this section, we brieﬂy review the BGP protocol and
discuss some of its vulnerabilities, to set the stage for
PGBGP. We then discuss the use of anomaly detection
for detecting BGP attacks, focusing on the use of BGP
update messages.
2.1 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
Internet routing operates at the level of IP address blocks,
or preﬁxes. Regional Internet Registries (RIR), such as
ARIN, RIPE, and APNIC, allocate IP preﬁxes to insti-
tutions such as Internet Service Providers. These insti-
tutions may, in turn, subdivide the address blocks and
delegate these smaller blocks to other ASs, such as their
customers. Ideally, the RIRs would be notiﬁed when
changes occur, such as an AS delegating portions of its
address space to other institutions, two institutions com-
bining their address space after a merger or acquisition,
or an institution splitting its address space after a com-
pany break-up. However, the registries are notoriously
out-of-date and incomplete. Ultimately, BGP update
messages and the BGP routing tables themselves are the
best indicator of the active preﬁxes and the ASs respon-
sible for them. BGP tables today contain around 170,000
active preﬁxes, and growing, with preﬁxes appearing and
disappearing over time.
ASs exchange information about howto reach destina-
tion preﬁxes using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
A BGP-speaking router learns how to reach external des-
tination preﬁxes via BGP sessions with routers in neigh-
boring ASs. BGP has two kinds of update messages—
announcements and withdrawals. Upon receiving an
announcement for a destination preﬁx, the router over-
writes the old route (if any) from the neighbor with the
new information. Announcements contain information
suchasthedestinationpreﬁx, theannouncer’sIPaddress,
and the AS path the route will take. As the route an-
nouncementpropagates, eachASaddsitsownuniqueAS
number to the AS path. The router responds to a with-
drawal message by deleting the previously announced
route from its routing table. BGP routing changes can
occur for many reasons, such as equipment failures, soft-
ware crashes, policy changes, or malicious attacks. In-
ferring the cause directly from the BGP update messages
is a fundamentally difﬁcult, if not impossible, problem.
If a router learns multiple routes for a preﬁx, a sin-
gle “best” route is chosen by applying the BGP deci-
sion process. The decision process is a non-standard se-
quence of about a dozen rules that compare one route to
another [1]. Over the years, additional steps have been
added to the decision process to give operators greater
ﬂexibility and control over their networks. Generally, a
router prefers routes that conform to the policies of the
local network operator. Next, the router prefers routes
withtheshortestASpath. Ifmultipleequallygoodroutes
remain, the router can apply additional rules, ultimately
resolving ties arbitrarily to ensure a single answer. Be-
cause the decision process does not consider trafﬁc load
or performance metrics, the selected route is not neces-
sarily optimal from a performance point of view.
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according to local routing policies, which are based on
the business relationships with neighboring ASs [15, 16].
The most common relationships are customer-provider
and peer-peer. In a customer-provider relationship, the
provider ensures that its customer can communicate with
the rest of the Internet by exporting its best route for each
preﬁx, and by exporting the customer’s preﬁxes to other
neighboring ASs. In contrast, the customer does not
propagateroutes learned from one providerto another. In
a peer-peer relationship, two ASs connect solely to trans-
fer trafﬁc between their respective customers. An AS
announces only the routes learned from its customers to
its peers. These business relationships drive local prefer-
ences, which in turn inﬂuence the decision process. Typ-
ically, an AS prefers customer-learned routes over peer-
learned routes, and peer-learned routes over provider-
learned routes.
2.2 BGP Vulnerabilities
Many BGP vulnerabilities arise from the lack of reliable
information about preﬁx ownership and the ease with
which malicious parties can introduce BGP announce-
ments for preﬁxes they do not own. In a preﬁx hijack, an
adversary conﬁgures a router to announce a destination
preﬁx that it does not own. The idea being that trafﬁc
destined for the legitimate AS will be diverted to the at-
tacking AS. The adversary can drop the hijacked trafﬁc,
causing a denial-of-service known as a black hole. For
example, on December 24, 2004, a time in which many
operators were on holiday, thousands of preﬁxes were hi-
jacked by AS 9121 (TTnet) [17], leading to widespread
disruptions in Internet connectivity.
Insteadofdroppingthetrafﬁc, theadversarycansnoop
the packets before directing them to the legitimate host.
In the worst case, the adversary could impersonate the
services of the legitimate host, such as a government
or ﬁnancial Web site, to publish misinformation or steal
sensitive user data. Even a short-lived attack can inﬂict
signiﬁcant damage, such as identity theft from a large
number of users. In fact, short-lived attacks are an effec-
tive way to avoid arousing the suspicion of users and op-
erators. Short-lived preﬁx hijacks also arise due to con-
ﬁguration mistakes, where a network operator inadver-
tently conﬁgures a router to announce the wrong preﬁx
(e.g., due to a typographical error).
2.2.1 Preﬁx Hijacks are Hard to Prevent and Detect
Preﬁx hijacking is surprisingly difﬁcult to prevent. Ide-
ally, every AS would apply ﬁlters to the routes learned
from neighboring ASs, to discard BGP routes for unex-
pected preﬁxes. Although an AS directly connected to
the adversary could easily ﬁlter announcements for un-
expected preﬁxes, best common practices for route ﬁl-
tering are not deployed ubiquitously. But, even vigi-
lant ASs cannot easily apply ﬁlters to BGP routes that
originate several AS hops away, because the AS would
not know what origin AS to expect for each preﬁx.
Also, the overhead of applying large preﬁx-ﬁltering rules
can overwhelm today’s routers [17], forcing operators to
make difﬁcult trade-offs between security and robustness
when conﬁguring route ﬁlters. Ultimately, even security-
conscious operators cannot completely protect their ASs.
Preﬁx hijacking is sometimes difﬁcult to detect, too.
Ideally, a preﬁx would have a single origin AS for its
entire lifetime, making a route announcement with a dif-
ferent origin AS a clear indication of an attack. How-
ever, preﬁxesmaychangeownership. Forexample, some
companies and universities prefer to have their upstream
provider announce their preﬁxes into BGP on their be-
half. If the institution switches providers, a new AS
would start announcing the preﬁx. In addition, a small
fraction of preﬁxes have more than one legitimate origi-
nating AS [18]. For example, an institution might have
multiple upstream providers that each announce the pre-
ﬁx into BGP. Thus, not all new origins for a preﬁx nec-
essarily imply a preﬁx-hijack attempt.
2.2.2 Sub-preﬁx Hijacks are Especially Difﬁcult
In a conventional preﬁx-hijacking attack, some ASs di-
rect trafﬁc toward the adversary while others continue
to forward packets to the legitimate destination. How-
ever, a small modiﬁcation can make the attack even more
dangerous. When a data packet arrives on an incom-
ing link, the router looks in its forwarding table for the
entry with the longest matching preﬁx. By announcing
more speciﬁc preﬁxes (sub-preﬁxes), the adversary can
trick nearly every AS into using the malicious route. For
example, the adversary could announce BGP routes for
two sub-preﬁxes, each covering half of the address space
of the original preﬁx. Routers throughout the Internet
would select a best BGP route for each preﬁx—the orig-
inal preﬁx and the two sub-preﬁxes. Yet, these routers
would forward data packets based on the longest match-
ing preﬁx—a sub-preﬁx announced by the adversary.
Ideally, route ﬁltering would help prevent such attacks
by discarding BGP announcements for small address
blocks. However, the network operators in one AS can-
not easily determine what preﬁx lengths are reasonable
to expect for each part of the IP address space. Operators
typically take the conservative approach of allowing an-
nouncementsforpreﬁxescorrespondingto256addresses
or more (i.e., a preﬁx with a mask length of 24 bits or
less), rather than run the risk of blackholing legitimate
trafﬁc. Even if they could be detected, sub-preﬁx hijacks
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a network operator detects a sub-preﬁx hijack and con-
ﬁgures a route ﬁlter to discard the offending route. Al-
though that AS’s routers would then forward data pack-
ets based on the original preﬁx, other ASs in the path to
the legitimate destination might still be forwarding pack-
ets based on the malicious sub-preﬁx. These ASs would
essentially deﬂect the packets onto a path toward the ad-
versary anyway.
Finally, not all new sub-preﬁxes are triggered by ma-
licious attacks or conﬁguration errors. Preﬁxes are often
legitimately subdivided into smaller blocks when one AS
delegates address space to another. In addition, a legiti-
mate AS might start advertising sub-preﬁxes of a larger
address block to exert ﬁne-grain control over the incom-
ing trafﬁc (e.g., for effective load balancing over multiple
incoming links). A sub-preﬁx might also be announced
when a customer connects to a new provider. For exam-
ple, consider a customer that owns a small portion of its
provider’s address block. If the customer has no other
providers, other ASs can reach the destinations through
the provider’s larger address block, obviating the need to
announce the more-speciﬁc preﬁx. However, if the cus-
tomer decides to enlist a second provider, both providers
need to start announcing the sub-preﬁx to ensure that
the customer receives trafﬁc through both connections.
Hence, sub-preﬁx announcements sometimes have legit-
imate causes, even when they seem suspicious.
2.3 Challenges of BGP Anomaly Detection
The previous subsection showed that it is difﬁcult to de-
termine which announcements are legitimate. That is,
the problem of classifying a route announcement as le-
gitimate or malicious is to some extent ambiguous. Con-
sequently, we must rely on methods that can evaluate an-
nouncements in the context of the network’s history and
current state. One way to do this is with anomaly detec-
tion, in which the normal behavior of a process is char-
acterized by a model, and deviations from the model are
called anomalies.
In behavior-based anomaly-detection systems, exam-
ples of normal behavior are presented to the system in
a training phase and a model of normal behavior is con-
structed from these examples. In some cases, examples
of known attacks (labeled data) are also presented dur-
ing training to simplify the learning problem. However,
in many situations, the space of possible attacks is not
understood well enough to use this simpliﬁcation. For-
mally, the anomaly-detection problem can be viewed as
a one-class online learning problem in non-stationary en-
vironments. The learning is “one class” if the system is
presented only with examples of normal behavior dur-
ing training; it is “online” if the learning must occur
while the system is operating and making routing deci-
sions, and it is “non-stationary” if the learned concepts
can change through time. For BGP, all three of these
conditions hold, complicating the detection problem.
Over time, the detector needs to incorporate new
information, so that it is not making decisions based
solely on old data. This is because over time preﬁxes
change ownership and location, preﬁxes are subdivided,
and previously unallocated preﬁxes are announced—the
nonstationary environment. Without incorporating new
data, the detector would have fewer and fewer legiti-
mate routes available to it. The anomaly detector also
needs to eliminate old routes if they are no longer ac-
tive. This consideration addresses scalability as well as
security. Preserving a long history of old routes is poten-
tially memory intensive, and in the event that a hijacked
route is erroneously accepted (a false negative), the sys-
tem needs some mechanism of recovery.
A ﬁnal complication is that unlabeled attack data may
occur in the training data. In the BGP domain, this arises
because some of the announcements used during training
may in fact be attacks.
We incorporated these considerations into a simple
learning and response rule for PGBGP—accept all new
routes after they have survived an initial probationary pe-
riod. In addition, routes that have not shown recent activ-
ity are removed from the history. We deﬁne recent activ-
ity as a route that appears in an update message or resides
in a router’s table within a window of time that we call
the history period. PGBGP is an anomaly detector in that
it treats the window of recently active routes as normal
and everything else as anomalous. PGBGP learns new
behavior by incorporating new routes into the normal de-
ﬁnition after a probationary period, called the suspicious
period. As most bad routes do not persist for very long,
PGBGP can tolerate attacks in the continuous stream of
training data, as they will usually disappear before being
incorporated into the deﬁnition of normal. Finally, PG-
BGP implicitly responds to anomalies by avoiding the
suspicious routes.
3 Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP)
The basic idea of PGBGP is to delay the adoption of new
routes for forwarding data trafﬁc. We argue that PGBGP
allows time for a secondary process to check if the new
route announcement is valid, while protecting the net-
work in the meantime. Although PGBGP is applicable
to various kinds of BGP attacks, we initially focus on
how to identify and prevent preﬁx and sub-preﬁx hijacks
by delaying their propagation. We also discuss the ef-
fects of false positives (i.e., when a valid announcement
is mistakenly classiﬁed as suspicious) on the network.
43.1 Identifying Hijack Attempts
PGBGP detects preﬁx hijacks by monitoring the origin
ASs in BGP announcements for each preﬁx over time.
If an announcement has an origin AS that has not been
seen recently for said preﬁx, PGBGP treats the route as
anomalous. We deﬁne ”recent” as any origin that has
been announced or resided in the router’s BGP table for
thatpreﬁxwithinthelasthdayswherehishistoryperiod
of the anomaly detector. Sub-preﬁx hijacks are discov-
ered by monitoring new preﬁxes. New preﬁxes that are
completely contained by recently seen preﬁxes are po-
tentially sub-preﬁx hijack attempts, and PGBGP treats
them as anomalous. The router continues to treat the
origin AS as anomalous for this preﬁx for a period of
s days, where s is the length of the suspicious period of
the anomaly detector. If the route is known to be good,
the router can be reconﬁgured sooner to treat the route as
normal.
When an anomalous route is discovered, the router
generates an alarm, triggering a secondary process to
check the validity of the new route. This could be
either network operators or an automated network-
management system. In some cases, the neighboring AS
may advertise a different route or withdraw the anom-
alousrouteafterabriefperiodoftime, obviatingtheneed
for an explicit response. This could happen if the new
route were caused by a conﬁguration error or a short-
lived attack. By delaying adoption of the route, an AS
would protect its customers from the short-lived prob-
lem, even if other ASs adopted it. This provides a tan-
gible beneﬁt for early adopters of PGBGP and an incen-
tives for other ASs, lest they lose customers to the early
adopters.
In other cases, the anomalous route may persist, re-
quiring further investigation. Groups of ASs who trust
each other might work together, out of band from BGP,
to determine whether the new route appears suspicious,
perhaps using an overlay service like the one proposed
in [19]. Trust relationships can be based on personal or
businessrelationships, orpriorknowledgethatanASfol-
lows best common practices for securing its infrastruc-
ture, applies protective route ﬁlters, or runs PGBGP. As
part of the investigation, a network-management sys-
tem could launch active probes to learn how data traf-
ﬁc would be handled by neighbors announcing the sus-
picious route. These probes might reveal unexpectedly
long propagation delays or unusual hops in the IP-level
path, conﬁrming a problem. The probes could also send
application-level messages to the end hosts via the suspi-
cious path, allowing comparisons to the content available
via the other paths.
3.2 Avoiding Preﬁx Hijacks
A PGBGP-enabled router avoids selecting anomalous
routes whenever possible. If the router has alternative
routes for the preﬁx, the router selects the best of the al-
ready known routes. False positives, while possible, only
favor the less-preferred route temporarily. If no alterna-
tive route exists, the router could either select the suspi-
cious route (in the hope of avoiding a black hole) or not
select any route (rather than direct data trafﬁc to a risky
route). The ﬁrst approach favors the known route until
the very last step in the decision process, whereas the
second approach simply disregards all suspicious routes.
This choice is a policy decision that should be left to net-
work operators, although we envision the ﬁrst alterna-
tive being preferred in order to avoid losing reachability
when false positives occur.
As an example of how PGBGP would respond to a
real attack, consider the previously mentioned attack on
Google. On May 7th of 2005, at 14:37:56 UTC, the pre-
ﬁx 64.233.161.0/24 (which at the time contained IP ad-
dresses for www.google.com) was originated by AS 174
for one hour. To understand the impact, we analyzed the
RouteViewsBGPupdatefeeds[20]providedbyEquinix,
a large service provider, during that period. From the
routes announced by the Equinix peers, three ASs (2914,
6730, and 13645) chose the route to the hijacking AS
174. The other three (3257, 16559, and 1239) chose
the route to the legitimate AS. An AS running PGBGP
could have avoided using the malicious route, as AS 174
was a new origin for the preﬁx and the other had been
stable for months. So long as at least one of Equinix’s
peers provided a route to the legitimate origin, PGBGP
would have chosen correctly. Because the attack lasted
for one hour, even a relatively small suspicious period
would have thwarted the attack.
3.3 Avoiding Sub-Preﬁx Hijacks
In the case of preﬁx hijacks, anomalous routes are
avoided by selecting an alternative route. Thwarting a
sub-preﬁx hijack is more complicated, however, because
the router does not have any normal routes available for
the sub-preﬁx. There are two possible approaches to this
problem. One approach would be to avoid selecting any
route for the sub-preﬁx by relying on the route for the
larger address block to forward the data packets. This
would allow the AS to continue forwarding packets nor-
mally, using the BGP route for the larger address block.
This approach is ﬂawed, however, because a downstream
AS that chose a malicious route would deﬂect the data
packets toward the adversary. Hence, we should ex-
pect that PGBGP would have to be widely deployed for
this approach to be effective. Instead, a PGBGP-enabled
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sub-preﬁx (e.g., by installing a “null” route in the for-
warding table), rather than risk having a downstream AS
deﬂect data packets toward a malicious adversary. As
before, the choice between these two options is a policy
decision left to the network operator, although the ﬁrst
approach would prevent an honest AS from accidentally
creating a denial-of-service.
An interesting question is how the announcement of a
new preﬁx that is not contained in a larger address block
should be handled. In this case, the new announcement
provides a route to an address block that was previously
unreachable, and thus, cannot be hijacking trafﬁc des-
tined to another, legitimate AS. PGBGP accepts the new
announcement and installs the new preﬁx in the forward-
ing table. This scenario might arise when an AS an-
nounces a BGP route for a private address block, a re-
served address block, or a block that has not yet been al-
located by the Regional Internet Registries. In practice,
the routers in a well-run AS would be conﬁgured with
route ﬁlters that discard such “bogon” routes [21]. The
BGP route announcement would then be discarded be-
fore the PGBGP rules could be applied. After an Internet
registry allocates a new address block, the vigilant op-
erator modiﬁes the route ﬁlters to allow announcements
for the new block. When the ﬁrst announcement arrived,
a PGBGP-enabled node would accept the new route and
use it to forward packets1.
Legitimate new sub-preﬁxes will sometime be treated
as suspicious by PGBGP—a false positive. In this case,
the router will forward packets based on the larger ad-
dress block it used before the sub-preﬁx was announced.
In many cases, two valid announcements (for the larger
and smaller address blocks) would have the same origin
AS or traverse the same downstream AS. This would oc-
cur, for instance, if a service provider delegated a portion
of its address block to a customer AS. In this scenario,
forwarding based on the larger address block would be
completely appropriate and likely have no effect on the
ﬂow of trafﬁc. However, if the customer connects to
multiple providers and is announcing the sub-preﬁx to
control the ﬂow of inbound trafﬁc, the situation is more
complicated. Here, the PGBGP-enabled router could be
temporarily disregarding the wishes of the origin AS by
sending data trafﬁc along a different (albeit still valid)
path. Once the sub-preﬁx announcement was deemed
to be legitimate, trafﬁc would ﬂow as the origin AS in-
tended.
The only situation that would compromise reachabil-
ity arises if the origin AS switched providers, while
still retaining the IP address block allocated by its old
provider—a practice sometimes explicitly disallowed by
the business agreement between customer and provider.
In this case, forwarding packets based on the larger ad-
dress block would be a mistake that could lead to a tem-
porary black hole. In practice, when an AS switches
providers, the AS typically connects to both providers
during a transition period to avoid an abrupt loss of con-
nectivity (e.g., if the old provider disconnects the cus-
tomer before the new connection starts). The common
practice of maintaining the old connection for a brief pe-
riod would also give the PGBGP-enabled ASs time to
learn about the new route and determine that it was valid.
In summary, PGBGP prevents sub-preﬁxes covered by
other BGP preﬁxes from entering the decision process
until the suspicious period has passed. Once this pe-
riod has passed, all of the associated routes are accepted
into the decision process, and trafﬁc to valid sub-preﬁxes
ﬂows freely over the same paths that they would in BGP
today.
3.4 Decision Process and Convergence
To maximize protection from malicious routes, an AS
should always prefer safe (non-suspicious) routes, when
available. That is, preference for non-suspicious routes
should be the ﬁrst step in the decision process, ahead of
local preference and AS-path length. This introduces an
interesting economic trade-off for the AS. Local prefer-
ence is typically based on the business relationship with
the neighboring AS, with the highest preference reserved
for customer-learned routes and the lowest for provider-
learned routes. Selecting a safe route learned from a
provider over a new route learned from a customer goes
against the AS’s immediate economic incentive to gain
revenue by directing as much trafﬁc as possible through
downstream customers. Some network operators, as a
matter of policy, might prefer to keep local preference as
the ﬁrst step in the decision process, applying the PG-
BGP heuristic as a a second step.
Although the preference-ﬁrst policy might be appeal-
ing ﬁnancially, it could substantially reduce the effective-
ness of PGBGP. For example, consider a scenario with
ubiquitous deployment of PGBGP, but where every AS
applies the PGBGP heuristic as the second step in the
decision process. Then, the provider of the malicious AS
would select the malicious route, unless the legitimate
route was learned from one of its other customers. In
turn, that AS’s provider would pick the malicious route,
unless the legitimate route was learned from one of its
customers. As a result, large portions of the Internet
might still direct trafﬁc to the malicious AS. This sce-
nario would also hamper PGBGP in avoiding sub-preﬁx
hijacks. When using local preference as the ﬁrst step,
an AS would always select the suspicious route to a sub-
preﬁx, ratherthanforwardingtrafﬁcbasedonasaferoute
for the larger address block.
In spite of the short-term ﬁnancial beneﬁt of a
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Figure 1: Fraction of announcements classiﬁed as suspi-
cious using different history periods (h).
preference-ﬁrst policy, it might make longer-term busi-
ness sense to be cautious. First, the AS would not vi-
olate its normal preference rules very often or for very
long. Only a small fraction of BGP routes would be clas-
siﬁed as anomalous and for a short period of time. False
positives could be handled even more quickly if the sec-
ondary process for validating the route were successful.
Second, protection against malicious routes is a valuable
security service for the AS’s customers; customers might
use security as a criteria for choosing an AS. Third, an
AS would rarely view a route learned from its customer
as anomalous. A well-run AS would have good infor-
mation about valid preﬁxes for its own customers, and
could apply route ﬁlters to discard routes for unexpected
preﬁxes. In practice, we envision that anomalous routes
would be acquired primarily from peers and providers.
Any modiﬁcation to the decision process needs to con-
sider the possible effects on BGP convergence. Although
BGP is not guaranteed to converge for all combinations
of routing policies [22], ASs typically select and export
routes based on their business relationships. If every AS
prefers customer-learned routes, BGP convergence can
be provably guaranteed [15]. As long as local prefer-
ence remains the ﬁrst step in the decision process, the
guidelines in [15] are still being followed and conver-
gence is assured. However, ranking all anomalous routes
lower than other routes seems to violate these guidelines.
For example, an AS would prefer a non-suspicious route
learnedfromapeeroveransuspiciousroutelearnedfrom
a customer. Fortunately, this does not cause a prob-
lem. Removing the suspicious route from consideration
is conceptually the same as having the customer decide
not to announce the route to the AS in the ﬁrst place.
The convergence guarantee in [15] holds when ASs ap-
ply more conservative export policies than their business
relationships normally suggest.
3.5 Tuning PGBGP’s Timer Parameters
Two important parameters, the suspicious period (s) and
the history period (h), affect the behavior of PGBGP.
These parameters correspond to the time an anomalous
route is avoided before being accepted (s) and the time
that an origin AS is viewed as “recently seen” (h).
Parameter s should be long enough for network oper-
ators to detect and resolve problems before they spread,
but no longer than necessary. If s is too long, false pos-
itives will be slow to self-correct. A previous study of
BGP misconﬁguration showed that roughly 45% of new
origins and preﬁxes exist for less than 24 hours [11].
Thesearetemporaryroutessuchasrouteleaksandhijack
attempts. Because 24 hours is also a reasonable length of
time for an operator to analyze and ﬁx a routing problem,
we use this value for s.
Parameter h cannot be too short, or many valid ori-
gin ASs will be treated as anomalies following a brief
outage. On the other hand, h should not not be longer
than necessary for three reasons. First, the implemen-
tation overhead grows with the size of h, because the
router must store information about the past (preﬁx, ori-
gin AS) pairs. Second, a long history period might allow
a repeated preﬁx-hijack attack to become trusted, if an
undetected malicious origin AS remained in the history
buffer. Third, h will effectively set the initial training
time for a router coming online unless it is bootstrapped
with history information from other routers in the same
AS.
To set h, we ran the PGBGP algorithm on RouteViews
BGP update data from Equinix for the months of May
through July of 2005 with a 24-hour suspicious period.
The average fraction of incoming announcements that
are labeled anomalous for either presenting a new origin
or sub-preﬁx are displayed in Figure 1 for each evaluated
history period. The ﬁgure suggests that a correlation be-
tween the rate of introduced sub-preﬁxes and new origins
exists which is expected since any origin for a new preﬁx
will be suspicious since it is also new. The ﬁgure shows
only marginal reductions in the rate of anomalies after
three days. We speculate that three days is enough time
for network operators to ﬁx equipment failures that cause
a legitimate (preﬁx, origin AS) pair to disappear from
view. Particularly for small ASs, such as universities or
small companies, disruptions in connectivity might rea-
sonably persist for a couple of days before repair. Thus,
weselectedthreedaysasthevalueforthehistoryperiod.
4 The PGBGP Simulator
Wehavedevelopedahigh-levelBGPsimulatorforevalu-
atingrouteselectionandpropagationonlargetopologies.
The software, available for download under the GPL li-
7cense [23], simulates BGP and PGBGP routing decisions
on an AS topology with routing policies based on the
business relationships. In this section, we describe the
AS-level topology, the decision process and route prop-
agation, and how the simulator is conﬁgured for the ex-
periments in Section 5.
4.1 AS Topology and Relationships
Large ASs are often spread over vast geographical ar-
eas and have many BGP-speaking routers. Because we
are concerned only with AS-level behavior, each AS’s
network is represented as a single node in the graph.
In spite of this simpliﬁcation, determining the AS-level
topology of the Internet is a difﬁcult problem. Much of
the topology can be inferred from the BGP routing an-
nouncements themselves. For example, suppose that an
AS A announces the paths (A,C,D,E) and (A,C,D,T,Y)
for two different preﬁxes. These paths imply the exis-
tence of several edges in the AS-level topology, namely
(A,C), (C,D), (D,E), (D,T), and (T,Y). The AS paths
also provide a glimpse into the business relationships be-
tween ASs. For example, the path (A,C,D,E) implies that
AS A is permitted to transit trafﬁc through AS C to AS
D. As such, we can infer that AS A and AS D cannot
both be providers or peers of AS C. Each path implies
a set of constraints on the relationships between ASs.
By combining these constraints across a large number of
paths, inference algorithms can classify the relationship
between each pair of adjacent ASs as customer-provider
or peer-peer [24].
Based on the topology and AS relationships, we iden-
tiﬁed a set of ASs that are likely at the top of the AS
“hierarchy,” the core ASs. These ASs connect to each
other via peer-peer links and provide transit service to
large customer bases. We label an AS as core if it has
peer-peer relationships with ﬁfteen or more neighbors.
For our experiments, we used the AS topology and busi-
ness relationships described in [25], which were inferred
from BGP routing data collected primarily from Route-
Views [20]. The topology has 18,943 ASs with an aver-
age of four AS-AS links each. The work in [25] intro-
duced the concept of a sibling relationship, which we ap-
proximate as a peer-peer relationship. The network has
62 core ASs according to our deﬁnition. Although in-
ferring AS topology and business relationships is by no
means perfect, we believe that the inferred graph is rep-
resentative of the connectivity and hierarchical structure
present in today’s Internet.
4.2 Route Selection and Propagation
The simulator models how each AS selects and propa-
gates a best route for a preﬁx. Following conventional
business practices, an AS exports its best route to a peer
or provider only if the route was learned from a cus-
tomer; in contrast, an AS always exports its best route
to its customers. For each AS, the simulator models a
decision process with three main steps. First, the routes
with highest local preference are selected; highest pref-
erence is given to routes announced by customers, then
peers, and ﬁnally providers. Next, routes with the short-
est AS paths are chosen. If multiple routes remain, the
route learned from the neighbor with the lowest AS num-
ber is arbitrarily chosen as the tie-breaker. The simulator
does not model other steps in the decision process, which
relate to details of intra-AS topology and routing. When
PGBGP is enabled, anomalous routes are removed from
consideration either before or after the local-preference
step, depending upon the conﬁguration of the simulator.
The simulator propagates routes by visiting the origi-
nator’s neighbors in breadth-ﬁrst order. Upon reception
of the new route, the neighbors run the decision process
and propagate the route to their neighbors if it is selected
as the best route. Cycles are avoided by ignoring routes
that contain the receiving AS in the path. The propaga-
tion process continues until all of the ASs’ best routes
have stabilized. Every experiment terminated success-
fully, consistent with the observation in Section 3.4 that
the routing system should converge.
Our experiments determine which ASs would select
a malicious route, and how PGBGP limits and delays
the propagation of the route across the AS topology.
Studying the propagation of the malicious route does
not require any simulation of network dynamics such as
topology changes, route-ﬂap damping, or conﬁguration
changes. Instead, the simulator repeats the computation
of the ASs’ routing decisions once every s steps. First,
the simulator computes the routing decisions for each AS
with only the legitimate AS originating the preﬁx. Then,
the simulator introduces a malicious AS that also orig-
inates the preﬁx, and recomputes the routing decisions.
Because some ASs may suppress the malicious route for
s steps, we then evaluate what happens when these ASs
stop suppressing the route. The process repeats until no
ASs change their decisions. Since the AS-level diame-
ter of the Internet is small, no experiment required more
than six steps to complete.
4.3 Experimental Conﬁguration
The simulator has several conﬁgurable parameters, as
summarized in Table 1. These include h and s, which
are set to 3 days and 1 day, respectively. There are also
two deployment options. A random deployment enables
PGBGP on a random set of nodes, modeling a situation
where all ASs are equally likely to deploy the enhanced
protocol. The core + random deployment enables PG-
8Variable Values
History period (h) number of days (3)
Suspicious period (s) number of days (1)
Deployment type random or (core + random)
Local preference before PGBGP or after
Attack type preﬁx or sub-preﬁx hijack
Runs positive integer (500)
Table 1: Simulator parameters (and default values)
BGP on the 62 core nodes (i.e., the ASs with ﬁfteen or
morepeers)andarandomchosensubsetoftheremaining
nodes, modeling a likely scenario in which a small num-
ber of large service providers deploy the enhanced proto-
col, along with a random set of other ASs. The simulator
also has the option of removing anomalous routes from
consideration either before or after the local-preference
step in the BGP decision process.
We can simulate both preﬁx and sub-preﬁx hijacks. In
the ﬁrst case, a randomly chosen AS originates the pre-
ﬁx and, on the next simulated day, a randomly chosen
attacking AS originates the same preﬁx. Sub-preﬁx hi-
jacks are simulated identically except that the attacking
AS announces a sub-preﬁx of the legitimate AS’s pre-
ﬁx. Each “Run” simulates a single attack instance for
the given parameter settings. Each set of runs is evalu-
ated with different fractions of ASs deploying PGBGP,
ranging from 0 to 100% in increments of 10%. For each
deployment scenario, attack type, and fraction of AS de-
ployment, we simulated 500 attacks.
5 Large-Scale Evaluation
This section reports simulation results on PGBGP’s ef-
fectiveness. First, we show that PGBGP can protect most
ASs from preﬁx hijack attacks, even when only a small
fraction of ASs deploy the enhanced protocol. Then, we
show that defending against sub-preﬁx hijacks requires
a wider-scale deployment of PGBGP. Next, we illus-
tratethatPGBGP’sautomatedresponsehelpsensureASs
learn a viable alternative to the malicious route. Then,
we demonstrate that false positives will self-correct over
time; all legitimate routes eventually propagate through-
out the network. Last, we show that PGBGP is most
effective if the decision process eliminates anomalous
routes in the ﬁrst step. The section ends with a summary
and discussion of future directions.
5.1 Stopping Preﬁx Hijacks
First, we study PGBGP’s ability to detect and avoid
preﬁx-hijack attempts immediately after the adversary
originates the route announcement. Figure 2 plots the
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Figure 2: Both Deployments, Preﬁx Hijack, Day One
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Fraction of ASs Deploying PGBGP
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
M
e
a
n
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
t
e
d
t
o
A
t
t
a
c
k
e
r
Core + Random
Random
Figure 3: Both Deployments, Sub-Preﬁx Hijack, Day
One
average fraction of ASs that select a route to the ma-
licious origin AS, as a function of the fraction of ASs
that have deployed PGBGP . The error bars represent the
standard error of the mean. The top curve plots the re-
sults for a random deployment of PGBGP . With zero de-
ployment, which represents BGP today, half of the ASs
select a route to the malicious AS, on average. With a
complete deployment of PGBGP , more than 99% of the
ASs are protected during the initial outbreak of an attack.
(Even with complete deployment, a few ASs may learn
only the malicious route. For example, the adversary’s
single-homed customers would learn only the malicious
route. In the extreme case where the adversary is the
sole provider for the legitimate origin AS, no other ASs
could learn the legitimate route.) Although incremental
deployment of PGBGP offers incremental gains, achiev-
ing substantial gains still requires a fairly large number
of randomly chosen ASs to enable PGBGP .
An AS that deploys PGBGP provides protection for
all neighbors that learn the AS’s best route. As such,
deploying PGBGP on the small number of core ASs of-
9fers substantial beneﬁts, as shown in the bottom curve in
Figure 2. Running PGBGP just on these 62 ASs (and
0% of the remaining ASs) ensures that, on average, less
than 2:5% of the ASs in the Internet select a route to
the malicious origin AS. Comparing with the top curve
shows that a completely random deployment would re-
quire three-fourths of the ASs to run PGBGP to offer the
same degree of protection. Along with the base deploy-
ment on the 62 core ASs, running PGBGP on a randomly
chosensetofadditionalASsoffersevenlargergains. The
results for the “core+random” scenario are very impor-
tant, because convincing a small number of large service
providers to run PGBGP is much easier than convinc-
ing ten thousand smaller ASs to do so. Large service
providers upgrade their router software much more fre-
quently and are more aware of the latest trends and best
common practices.
5.2 Stopping Sub-Preﬁx Hijacks
The results for sub-preﬁx hijacks are similar, although a
larger PGBGP deployment fraction is required to achieve
the same gains, as shown in Figure 3. With zero deploy-
ment of PGBGP, which represents BGP today, every AS
directs trafﬁc to the malicious AS, because the routers
forward packets based on the longest preﬁx match. The
incremental beneﬁts of deploying PGBGP on a random
set of ASs is not as signiﬁcant for sub-preﬁx attacks until
around 40% of ASs run the enhanced protocol, compared
with the top curve in Figure 2. The incremental gains are
smaller because ASs along the path to the legitimate ori-
gin AS may deﬂect the data packet toward the adversary.
Successfully avoiding the adversary sometimes depends
on these intermediate ASs running PGBGP as well.
Fortunately, the “core+random” deployment fares
much better because the large service providers do not
choose the malicious routes, and thus do not advertise
any route for the sub-preﬁx to their many customers. The
bottom curve in Figure 3 shows that deploying PGBGP
on the 62 core ASs, along with 20% of the remaining
ASs, protects 94% of ASs from the sub-preﬁx attack. In
fact, the results are nearly as good as the “core+random”
results for the preﬁx-hijack case in Figure 2. As an added
beneﬁt, ASs that never learn the sub-preﬁx (e.g., because
their providers classiﬁed it as suspicious) do not waste
space on the routers for storing the routes. This helps
protect smaller customer ASs with low-end routers from
the excessive overhead introduced by short-lived route
leaks caused by conﬁguration errors.
5.3 Importance of a Collective Response
In addition to avoiding malicious route, a PGBGP-
enabled AS plays an important role in ensuring that other
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5.4 Attack Propagation
For the simulation parameters, network operators have
a 24-hour period to detect and resolve attacks before the
routersautomaticallyaccepttheanomalousroutesasnor-
mal. If a malicious route has not been diagnosed and
blocked, some of these ASs would select the route and
propagate it to additional ASs, enabling the second wave
of an attack. If the route is legitimate (i.e., a false pos-
itive), a broader set of ASs will start learning about the
valid route. By analyzing how quickly these routes prop-
agate, wecanunderstandbothhowquicklyanundetected
malicious route spreads and how quickly a false positive
corrects itself.
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5.5 Prioritizing Local Preference
Section 3.4 discussed what might happen if ASs applied
their local preference rules as the ﬁrst step of the decision
process. Figure 7 illustrates the negative consequences
of this policy for the random deployment scenario under
preﬁx hijacks. When none of the ASs run PGBGP, half
of the ASs pick a malicious route, consistent with the top
curve in Figure 2. However, as an increasing fraction
of nodes adopt PGBGP, its beneﬁts are sharply reduced
compared to Figure 2. In fact, with local preference as
the ﬁrst step in the decision process, an average of 10%
of ASs would pick a malicious route even with ubiqui-
tous deployment of PGBGP. As discussed earlier (Sec-
tion 3.4), the adversary’s provider would pick the ma-
licious route unless it had a legitimate route from one
of its other customers. In turn, this AS’s customers and
providers would likely pick the malicious route as well.
It is worth noting that the change in ordering in the de-
cision process does not affect PGBGP’s ability to avoid
sub-preﬁx hijacks. For sub-preﬁx hijacks, the malicious
route corresponds to a unique preﬁx, so the comparison
based on local preference does not eliminate any legiti-
mate routes from consideration.
5.6 Summary and Discussion
Our experiments show that PGBGP is effective at pro-
tecting the network from preﬁx and sub-preﬁx hijack at-
tacks, especially when the small number of core ASs
11run the enhanced protocol. With PGBGP deployed in
the 62 core ASs and 30% of the remaining ASs, around
99% of the ASs can avoid preﬁx attacks and 95% can
avoid sub-preﬁx hijacks, compared to 50% and 0% re-
spectively with conventional BGP. In addition to avoid-
ing malicious routes, a PGBGP-enabled AS also helps
ensure that other ASs (including its customers) learn at
least one legitimate route. As time progresses, an anom-
alous route is allowed to propagate through the network,
unless the route disappears on its own or a secondary
process veriﬁes that the route is malicious; because of the
small diameter of the Internet, a new route would ﬁnish
propagating within 5 £ s, that is, within ﬁve days using
our parameters.
For all the experiments, we randomly selected the ma-
licious AS. This might be a reasonable assumption for
preﬁx hijacks caused by unintentional conﬁguration mis-
takes, or for adversarieswho must locate a vulnerable AS
(e.g., one that does not use route ﬁltering) to launch a hi-
jacking attack. However, some attacks would be difﬁcult
for PGBGP, or any other solution, to stop. For exam-
ple, suppose the adversary controls an AS that lies on all
paths to the legitimate origin AS—i.e., if the adversary
is the provider for the legitimate origin AS. (Admittedly,
such an attack seems unlikely because a provider would
not have an incentive to disrupt reachability to its own
customers, but this situation might arise due to an insider
attack. In future work, we plan to evaluate the effects
of targeted attacks such as these, in which the adversary
chooses the most damaging possible attack location. We
also plan to study the effectiveness of PGBGP in con-
junction with selective route ﬁltering. We hope to show
that combining route ﬁltering with PGBGP would enable
a well-run AS to protect itself, despite the presence of
other ASs that are not as careful.
Although hijacking attacks are among the most seri-
ous threats, they are not the only way for an adversary to
introduce false information into BGP. In future work, we
plan to evaluate PGBGP’s ability to block other kinds
of attacks. For example, an adversary might add or re-
move AS hops in the AS-path attribute to make a route
look more or less attractive. If AS A could reach AS
D by the path (A,B,C,D) but instead announced (A,B,D)
it would have falsely made its route more attractive to
its neighbors. Such an attack could be recognized by
keeping track of all recently seen routes for each preﬁx
and treating all routes with new AS-path subsequences
as anomalous. Preliminary results show that 15% of an-
nounced routes contain new AS-paths when the history
period is set to 3 days. We also plan to study the effec-
tiveness of ASs cooperating to determine the legitimacy
of a route.
6 Implementation and Deployment
Implementing PGBGP involves adding a single step to
the decision process running in software on the routers.
No changes to the BGP protocol, message format, or
the underlying router hardware are required, and one AS
could deploy PGBGP when others have not. This signif-
icantly lowers the barrier to deploying PGBGP in prac-
tice.
PGBGP would be a small extension to the BGP soft-
ware running on today’s routers. First, the router would
need to maintain a history buffer that stores recently seen
(preﬁx, origin AS) pairs that no longer appear in active
routes. When a BGP update message withdraws or over-
writes the last active route with this origin AS, the router
would record the (preﬁx, origin AS) pair along with a
timestamp in a hash table. A background process could
delete entries from the hash table once the history pe-
riod has expired. The history buffer would not need to
store any other BGP route attributes, such as the AS path
or community values. In contrast, the BGP routing ta-
ble (already stored on the router) must store complete
information for each active route from each neighboring
AS. In addition, we expect that the router would not have
to store history information for many inactive (preﬁx,
origin AS) pairs because legitimate preﬁxes rarely have
serious outages or change originating ASs in practice.
Thus, we expect the history buffer to be an extremely
small addition to the storage requirements on the router.
When a route announcement is received, the router
would determine if the last hop in the AS path matches
the origin AS of any existing (normal) route for that pre-
ﬁx, or matches an entry in the history buffer. If not,
the new route would be marked as anomalous, and a
timestamp stored with the entry in the routing table. A
background process could update the classiﬁcation after
s time periods. Finally, implementing PGBGP would
require an additional step in the BGP decision process
that compares routes based on their classiﬁcation. This
simple binary comparison could be applied either before,
or after, the determination of local-preference values,
depending on the router conﬁguration. This extra step
should run quickly, compared to the remaining dozen or
so steps in the BGP decision process.
Changes to the decision process require vendor adop-
tion of PGBGP, through an update of the software run-
ning on their routers. Alternatively, an AS could move
the entire responsibility for BGP path selection to a sep-
arate software platform, as advocated in [26]. The Rout-
ing Control Platform (RCP) would receive BGP update
messages from neighboring ASs and select a single best
route for each BGP preﬁx on behalf of each router. The
RCP uses the existing BGP protocol to send the best
route for each preﬁx to each router, without requiring
12any changes to the software on the legacy routers. The
RCP could implement a new decision process such as
that of PGBGP. By seeing BGP routes announced by all
neighbors, the RCP would be in a good position to iden-
tify anomalous routes and store historical data. The RCP
would also be a natural place to implement extensions to
PGBGP that allow trusted ASs to cooperate in detecting
malicious routes.
7 Related Work
Many proposed BGP security solutions, such as
sBGP [4] and soBGP [5], depend on central authorities
to maintain an accurate registry of preﬁx ownership and
to provide keys and signatures. However, such registries
have remained elusive. Alternative solutions, such as
Whisper [13] and MOAS lists [12] (lists of legitimate
origins for a preﬁx), detect suspicious routes by monitor-
ing the BGP messages exchanged between routers. Both
proposalsusetheBGPcommunityattributetoconveyex-
tra information along with the update. Unfortunately, in
ASs that have not deployed the protocol enhancements,
the routers are likely to strip the community tag. Al-
though the MOAS list monitor alerts the operator only
upon detection of a malicious route, Whisper prevents
suspected routes from being used. However, Whisper’s
“penalty-based route selection” policy only circumvents
ASs that are suspicious for multiple preﬁxes, and the so-
lution relies on ubiquitous deployment.
Kruegel et al. [14] proposes a solution that detects
preﬁx-hijack attempts and false updates based on geo-
graphical information obtained from a central registry,
such as the Whois database. Although Whois data are
often incomplete and out-of-date, they argue that the ge-
ographic locations of ASs do not change frequently. Al-
though their preﬁx-hijack detector bears some similarity
to PGBGP’s, it relies on precomputed preﬁx-ownership
lists and does not detect sub-preﬁx hijacks. Their detec-
tor passively responds to attacks by alerting the operator
to the problem, while still allowing the attack to propa-
gate. In contrast, PGBGP has an automated response that
prevents the dissemination of malicious routes.
The way that PGBGP responds to new routing infor-
mation is similar to route-ﬂap damping [27] and age-
based tie-breaking [1]. First, route-ﬂap damping tem-
porarily excludes unstable routes from the BGP decision
process. However, route-ﬂap damping suppresses routes
for an unstable (preﬁx, neighbor) pair, rather than con-
sidering the attributes of the route (such as the origin
AS). Second, age-based tie-breaking is a step later in
the BGP decision process on some routers. When two
routes are equally good, age-based tie-breaking prefers
an older route over a recent one. Age-based tie-breaking
only considers when the routes were learned, not the past
history or the route attributes. As with route-ﬂap damp-
ing, the goal is to improve stability, rather than security.
PGBGP has some similarities to rate limiting mecha-
nisms that have been proposed for other security prob-
lems. Virus throttling [28], for example, throttled back
abnormally high rates of outgoing connection attempts to
ensure that Internet viruses propagated slowly. Slowing
the propagation of a malicious route is similar to slow-
ing the propagation of viruses, although our mechanism
is quite different.
The PGBGP design differs from these earlier systems,
however, in that it does not actually delay packet deliv-
ery. PGBGP could also be viewed as a form of tempo-
rary quarantine [29], in which new routes are temporarily
quarantined from the rest of the network.
8 Conclusions
BGP is vulnerable to malicious attacks and conﬁguration
errors because the contents of route announcements can-
not be easily veriﬁed. This paper introduced an incre-
mentally deployable modiﬁcation to the BGP decision
process, called PGBGP, which can mitigate BGP’s most
critical vulnerabilities. The basic principle behind PG-
BGP is that routers should be cautious about adopting a
route with new information, such as an unfamiliar origin
AS. We implemented this simple heuristic by imposing a
24-hour period during which new routes are given lower
priority in the decision process. By avoiding new routes,
many attacks can be blocked for long enough to correct
the attacks before they cause widespread damage.
We evaluated the performance of PGBGP on two im-
portant classes of attack—preﬁx and sub-preﬁx hijacks.
Our results show that PGBGP is highly effective at
blocking the spread of hijacked routes, even with rela-
tivelysmall-scaledeployments. PGBGPcanprotect97%
of ASs from malicious preﬁx routes and 85% from ma-
licious sub-preﬁx routes when deployed only on the 62
core ASs in our study network. If PGBGP were deployed
on all ASs, protection would be greater than 99% in both
cases. In contrast, today’s BGP makes half of ASs vul-
nerable to a preﬁx hijack, and 100% vulnerable to a sub-
preﬁx hijack.
These results are signiﬁcant for several reasons. First,
we have showed that delaying the acceptance of new
routes is a safe and effective method for slowing the
propagation of malicious routes to a human time scale.
An important feature of our method is that false positives
self-correct within ﬁve days, so that legitimate changes
in the network are automatically incorporated. A second
feature of our approach is that it is incrementally deploy-
able: (1) PGBGP is compatible with the current BGP
protocol, requiring changes only to a router’s decision
rules; (2) Individual ASs have an incentive to adopt PG-
13BGP, as it provides immediate beneﬁt even if other ASs
have not deployed it. Finally, PGBGP is highly effective,
even if only the core ASs adopt it.
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